

A, then, at a basic level, you impose a negative externality on all candidate B supports and a positive externality on all candidate A supports. Since we know that there are more candidate A supporters, Krasa and Polborn argue you impose a net positive externality by voting for her. Moreover, since we do know that there are more candidate A supporters, increasing voter turnout evenly across all demographics will also have a net positive externality.

However, this conclusion is predicated on two assumptions that do not always hold and cannot be tested. The first is that everyone gains equal value from their candidate winning. If candidate B supporters get significantly more out of him winning than candidate A supporters lose, then higher voter turnout has a net negative externality. The second assumption is that everyone supports the candidate who is in their best long run interest. If candidate A supporters would actually benefit more from candidate B winning then, once again, higher voter turnout has a net negative externality.

It is impossible to determine whether or not these conditions are met in any given election cycle. In this country we cannot and should not charge a citizen to vote. Therefore we have an insurmountable insincere preference revelation problem when trying to determine how much someone values their candidate winning. If we simply ask people to rank how much value they would get out of their candidate winning, they would have incentive to lie because it might encourage others to vote for her. Similarly, we have no objective way to determine which candidate would practically be better for any individual outside of their stated preference. Thus we cannot conclusively determine whether or not high voter turnout has a negative or positive externality.

However, while higher voter turnouts may or may not benefit society, higher voting accessibility does. Drawing on the work of Immanuel Kant, Steven Pinker in *The Better Angels of Our Nature* argued that the increase in voting accessibility from a initial level

vote on election day. Rather, they suggested that they decreased individual motivation to vote because they encourage procrastination and take away from the excitement of election day. So the benefit is still only \$661,500 every four years.

There are two risks to voter accessibility associated with passing this bill. The first is that by encouraging the switch to mail in ballots, the bill inadvertently endangers voter privacy. The US does have a history of voter intimidation. It was especially common in the 19th century when newspapers would print pre-filled ballots that employers, or others in positions of authority, would distribute to those under them and when many cities still held elections by a public show of hands. This practice ended, and thus voting accessibility expanded, as cities and statesb sadli ti m tions th
adopted ct

The

Endnotes

1. Burden, Barry C., David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Donald P. Moynihan. "Election Laws, Mobiliz

