overview
Alastair Norcross (PhD, Syracuse, 1991) was born in the slums of South London, the illegitimate child of an Albanian prostitute and the Bishop of Basingstoke. After early childhood stints as a canary in a coal mine and a chimney sweep in Victorian England, he awoke from his dogmatic (and delusional) slumbers and attended Christ Church, Oxford, where he attempted to study Classics (puzzlingly called 鈥榣iterae humaniores鈥� by the locals). Another awakening occurred when he, like someone else before him whose name has faded into insignificance, read Hume, and realized that he could study philosophy and not have to read Greek and Latin all the damn time. And so, after collecting his classics (or more humane letters) degree, he crossed the pond to Syracuse, took a mere month or so to realize that it was pronounced 鈥楽irracuse鈥� over here, and set about getting his Ph.D in philosophy. His moral philosophy tutor at Oxford, Julia Annas, had attempted to turn him off utilitarianism, but had succeeded only in making him lean towards the rule, as opposed to the act, variety. Within a year of arriving in Syracuse, he realized that rule utilitarianism was an untenable compromise, and became the card-carrying, no-holds-barred, act utilitarian that he is today, although he does promulgate a slightly idiosyncratic version, known as 鈥榮calar utilitarianism鈥� (for details see various publications, and the recent book defending same). His proudest achievement at Syracuse was persuading Diana, no doubt against her better judgment, to marry him. His second proudest achievement was founding the theater company 鈥淭he Unbound Variables鈥� (with Diana), and directing and acting in three plays, including Twelfth Night and A Midsummer Night鈥檚 Dream. As director, he was able to cast himself in the most fun roles, so he played Malvolio and Bottom. After Syracuse, he taught for ten years at Southern Methodist University in Dallas (with one year off for good behavior in Tucson, Arizona), and then five years at Rice University in Houston. In 2007 Zeus forgave him for bringing fire to humanity, and let him out of Texas for good.
Prof. Norcross鈥檚 research is primarily in ethical theory. His overarching project is to make the world safe for consequentialist theories, in particular utilitarianism. Although he has many good friends who are Kantians (or other varieties of deontologist) and even some who are virtue ethicists, he still doesn't really understand how their minds work (as Wittgenstein says "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"), but so long as they keep drinking his martinis, he'll keep trying to understand. He also does some work in areas of applied ethics, such as abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights (though, like Bentham and Peter Singer, he regards all natural rights as nonsense, sometimes on stilts).
For more information, see Professor Norcross's and CV.
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selected publications
- Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands, Oxford University Press, 2020.
- 鈥淭he Immorality of Premarital Sexual Abstinence鈥�, in David Boonin (ed.), Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics, Palgrave 2021
- 鈥淰alue Comparability鈥�, in Douglas Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism, Oxford, 2020
- 鈥淪ubjects of a Life, the Argument from Risk, and the significance of self-consciousness鈥�, in Mylan Engel (ed.) The Moral Rights of Animals, Roman and Littlefield, 2016
- 鈥淒oing and Allowing鈥�, in Hugh Lafollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2013.
- 鈥淭he Significance of Death for Animals鈥�, in Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, and Jens Johansson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford University Press, 2013 (reprinted 2015)
- 鈥淎nimal Experimentation, Marginal Cases, and the Significance of Suffering鈥�, in Jeremy Garrett (ed.), The Ethics of Animal Research: Exploring the Controversy, MIT press, 2012.
- 鈥淎ct-Utilitarianism and Promissory Obligation鈥�, in Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press, 2010.
- 鈥淥ff Her Trolley? Frances Kamm and the Metaphysics of Morality鈥�, Utilitas Vol 20, No. 1, 2008
- 鈥淭wo Dogmas of Deontology: Aggregation, Rights, and the Separateness of Persons鈥�, Social Philosophy & Policy, January 2009.
- 鈥淎nimal Experimentation鈥�, Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, 2007.
- 鈥淩easons Without Demands: Rethinking Rightness鈥�, in James Dreier (ed.) Blackwell Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, 2006.
- 鈥淐ontextualism for Consequentialists鈥�, Acta Analytica, Vol 20, No. 2, 2005.
- 鈥淗arming in Context鈥�, Philosophical Studies, Vol 123, Nos 1-2, March 2005.
- 鈥淧uppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal cases鈥�, Philosophical Perspectives 18, 2004.
- 鈥淜illing and Letting Die鈥�, The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics, R. G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.) 2003, pp. 451-463.
- 鈥淐ontractualism and Aggregation鈥�, Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 28, No. 2, April 2002, pp. 303-314.
- 鈥淕reat Harms from Small Benefits Grow: How Death can be Outweighed by Headaches鈥�, Analysis, April 1998, pp.152-158.
- 鈥淕ood and Bad Actions鈥�, The Philosophical Review, Vol 106, No. 1; January 1997, pp. 1-34.
- 鈥淐onsequentialism and Commitment鈥�, The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 4, December 1997, pp. 380-403.
- 鈥淐omparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives鈥�, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2; Spring 1997, pp. 135-167.
- 鈥淪hould Utilitarianism Accommodate Moral Dilemmas?鈥�, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 79, No. 1; July 1995, pp. 59-85.
- 鈥淜illing, Abortion and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis鈥�, The Journal of Philosophy, May 1990, pp. 268-77.